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Two themes have dominated the debate on corporate tax reform in
recent years. First, there is a widespread perception that the cumulative
effect of piecemeal changes to the tax system has been to produce
major distortions in the pattern of savings and investment. The mag-
nitude of these distortions has recently been documented in King and
Fullerton (1984). As a result, the goal of' 'fiscal neutrality" has attracted
a good deal of support. Second, there has been growing concern over
the steady erosion of revenues accruing to the government from the
corporate sector.
The practical expression of these perceptions has been the elimi-
nation of many concessions to investment and savings, particularly at
the corporate level. This can be seen most clearly in the major overhaul
of the corporate tax system that occurred in the United Kingdom in
1984 (the transition to which was completed in April 1986) and in the
U.S. Treasury proposals in both their original November 1984 and
subsequent May 1985 versions (henceforth Treasury I and Treasury II
respectively). Throughout the postwar period, governments of various
persuasions have attempted to stimulate capital formation by offering
investment incentives of increasing generosity. These have taken the
form of cash grants, credits against tax liabilities, or straightforward
tax allowances. But the concessions were introduced in an ad hoc
fashion, and by the late 1970s the resulting pattern of incentives was
difficult to justify in terms of any rational view of the optimal taxation
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of savings. Effective tax rates on investment projects varied enor-
mously from one type of project to another (King and Fullerton 1984).
In response to these problems both, the U.S. and U.K. proposals were
an attempt to move toward fiscal neutrality by adopting a tax base that
could more accurately be described as a measure of economic income.
Many of the concessions to investment were eliminated in return for
a cut in the corporate tax rate.
The recent debate on tax reform in the United States and the United
Kingdom shows that the attempt to return to a comprehensive income
tax raises at least as many questions as it answers. The calculation of
economic depreciation of an asset, and the measures that are required
to index the corporate tax system for inflation, are very difficult to
implement in practice. It is appropriate, therefore, to ask whether there
is an alternative way to attain the objective of fiscal neutrality without
a significant erosion of the tax base.
In this paper we discuss such an alternative. It is called the cash
flow corporate income tax. The basic principle behind the idea is that
the company is taxed on the net cash flow received from its real business
activities. No distinction is made between capital and income in the
calculation of a company's tax base. By basing the tax on cash flow
the measurement of economic income is removed from the concern of
the tax authorities. Such a system achieves fiscal neutrality by har-
monizing investment incentives on a common basis, namely immediate
expensing of all investment expenditures. The incentive to invest with
such a tax is greater than would be the case under either Treasury I
or Treasury II plans, and also under the new U.K. corporate tax sys-
tem. The motivation for the cash flow tax is to apply the principles of
a consumption or expenditure tax to the corporate sector. The idea is
not new and can be traced back at least as far as Brown (1948); its
practical implementation was discussed in King (1975), Kay and King
(1978), Meade Committee (1978), and Aaron and Galper (1985).
There are three main parts to this chapter. First, section 12.2 de-
scribes the principles of a cash flow corporate income tax and explains
how it would work. The second part of the chapter analyzes the effects
of the corporate cash flow tax on the firm's choice of financial policy
and its debt-equity mix, and also upon the cost of capital facing the
company when making investment decisions. Financial policy is ana-
lyzed in section 12.3, and section 12.4 discusses the impact of the tax
on the cost of capital to a firm and the effective tax rate on an investment
project. Attention will be focused on three issues that have received
rather little attention in previous discussions. First, the nature of any
problems that arise from the interaction between a cash flow tax at the
corporate level and an income tax at the personal level. Second, the
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source of finance to the representative company, and the identification
of the marginal source of funds requires a general equilibrium model
of the corporate sector's capital structure. Third, the corporate cash
flow tax illustrates vividly the potential for dynamic inconsistency in
government fiscal policy.
The final chapter, section 12.5, discusses some of the more practical
problems that would arise if the cash flow corporate income tax were
to be implemented. These include (i) transitional arrangements,
(ii) international considerations, and (iii) the likely revenue conse-
quences of a change in the tax base.
12.2 A Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
Recent research has shown that the corporate income tax introduces
a number of distortions into savings and investment decisions. To elim-
inate these, one might either move to a more neutral tax base or elim-
inate the separate tax on corporations altogether. The latter course
would have many attractions were it not for the following two consid-
erations. First, a corporate income tax exists already, and to abolish
it would be to yield windfall capital gains to the current owners of
corporate equity. There is truth in the well-known adage that "an old
tax is a good tax." Second, in the absence of a tax on corporate income
it may be difficult to tax the capital income received by foreign investors
in domestic companies or domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations.
The cash flow corporate income tax represents an attempt to design
a tax that is neutral with respect to both financial and investment
decisions, and at the same time continues to yield the government
positive revenue from past investments, from profits in excess of the
normal rate of return, and also from activities financed by overseas
investors. It is attractive for a further reason, namely that the base of
the tax requires no adjustment for inflation, and hence that the com-
plicated indexation provisions for depreciation, for example, required
under alternative corporate tax systems are unnecessary with a cash
flow tax. This is because the tax is based on the sources and uses of
funds statement and not on the profit and loss account. The tax elim-
inates the necessity of calculating "economic profit." Hence there is
no need to construct a true measure of depreciation or to make any
adjustment for the effects of inflation.
The basic principle of the tax is to levy a charge on the net cash flow
to the company resulting from its real economic activities. The tax base
can be measured as the difference between the receipts from sales of
goods and services and the purchases of all real goods and services
required in the production process, including purchases of capital goods.
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financing of the investment. Hence there would be no deductibility of
either interest payments or dividends. The major departures from the
present system would be the granting of immediate expensing (100%
first-year depreciation allowances) to all forms of investment (but given
this there would be no need for an investment tax credit), and interest
payments would no longer qualify as a deduction for the purposes of
the corporate income tax. Moreover, there would be no room for div-
idend deduction schemes of the type proposed in the recent Treasury
plans. In practice, there would need to be transitional arrangements to
prevent both undue hardship and also tax avoidance during the tran-
sition from the current system to a new cash flow tax base. These, and
other practical questions to which satisfactory answers must be pro-
vided before the tax could be implemented, are discussed further in
section 12.5 below.
The nature of double-entry bookkeeping means that the total sources
of funds to a company are identical to its total uses of funds. An
important implication of this identity is that the base of the cash flow
tax can be described in either of two ways. The first is the difference
between sales and purchases: the net cash flow from real economic
activity. The second is the difference between dividends paid to share-
holders and issues of new shares.
The former may be described as the corporate cash flow base and
the latter as the net equity distributions base. To see the relationship
between the two, examine the corporate sources and uses of funds
shown in table 12.1. In terms of the notation of table 1, the two tax
bases, denoted by TBX and TB2 respectively, are given by the equations
(1) TBt = R - I
(2) TB2 = D - S.
Table 12.1 Corporate Sources and Uses of Funds
Sources Uses
R Receipts from sales of goods and / Investment expenditure (gross
services less purchases of labour, investment less receipts from
raw materials and services sales of assets)
B Borrowing (new issues of debt P Interest payments (net of interest
less repayments of old debt) received)
S New share issues (less share D Dividends paid (less dividends
repurchases), including net sales received)
of shares in other companies. j Taxes paid.
Accounting Identity R + B + S = I + P + D + T381 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
From the flow of funds identity it follows that
(3) TB2 + T= TBl + (B - P).
The two differences between the corporate cash flow and net equity
distributions bases can be seen to be the following. First, because taxes
paid enter into the sources and uses of funds statement, the corporate
cash flow basis is a measure of the tax base on a tax-inclusive basis,
whereas the definition in terms of net equity distributions is measured
on a tax-exclusive basis. If the tax rate on the corporate cash flow base
were 50%, then this would be equivalent to a tax rate of 100% on the
net equity distributions base. Second, to the extent that a company
earns real profits from transactions in financial assets (other than equi-
ties), then the corporate cash flow base would not include those profits.
Only if the net equity distributions base were used would such profits
be taxed. This is a major consideration for financial institutions, such
as banks, which derive their earnings primarily from the provision of
financial services for which no direct charge is levied but which are
reflected in differences between borrowing and lending rates. The same
phenomenon can be observed in the national accounts, in which the
real economic profits of the financial sector are recorded as negative.
This is because the national accounts use real transactions to measure
profits and ignore profits on financial transactions. If no profit is made
on such financial transactions, then the present value of interest pay-
ments equals the present value of net borrowing, and, over time, given
a constant tax rate, the corporate cash flow base and the net equity
distributions base are identical. This is likely to be approximately true
for major industrial corporations, and as far as nonfinancial activity is
concerned the two bases have identical economic effects. It will prove
convenient to analyze these effects in terms of the corporate cash flow
base because this may more readily be compared with the existing base
and with reforms that have been proposed. The two bases could be
made identically equal by modifying the corporate cash flow base to
include the difference between net new borrowing and net interest
payments. In other words, interest deducibility would continue, but
new borrowing would constitute a taxable receipt. It is clear from
equation (3) that the amended corporate cash flow base must in all
circumstances be identical to the net equity distributions base except
for the fact that the former is tax-inclusive and the latter tax-exclusive.
The tax-exclusive rate, t2, is related to the tax-inclusive rate, tit by the
equation382 Mervyn A. King
Apart from the treatment of profits on financial transactions, there
is a difference between the corporate cash flow base and the net equity
distributions base in terms of the transitional problems that might arise
in attempting to move from the present system toward a cash flow tax.
Some of these practical issues are taken up in section 12.5. But we
turn first to an analysis of the long-run effects of the cash flow corporate
income tax on the optimal financial and investment policy of a company
once the tax is in place, and we contrast these effects with those that
would follow from the adoption of alternative tax bases such as those
proposed in the recent Treasury plans.
12.3 Financial Policy and the Debt-Equity Mix
It is well known that the current U.S. corporate income tax affords
a tax advantage to debt rather than equity, because of the deductibility
of interest payments, and discriminates in favor of internal equity fi-
nance (retained earnings) and against the issue of new shares. The
rationale for this pattern of incentives is unclear. A thriving equity
market, particularly for new risk capital, provides one of the main
routes by which household savings are channeled into corporate in-
vestment. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that there have been
frequent proposals to relieve the double taxation of dividends inherent
in the present system. The most recent were the Treasury I and Trea-
sury II plans, both of which advocated a partial dividend deduction.
In this section we contrast the incentives to use debt and equity that
are implied by a cash flow tax on the one hand, and alternative reforms,
such as the Treasury dividend deduction proposal, on the other.
To do this we first analyze the effects of different taxes on a com-
pany's choice of financial policy in general, and then apply the results
to particular systems of company taxation. Both personal and corporate
taxes are relevant to the choice of debt-equity mix. Two personal tax
rates are distinguished here, the marginal income tax rate of investors,
denoted by m, and the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains,
denoted by z. Differences in tax rates among investors will be discussed
below. Because capital gains tax is charged on gains only when they
are realized, the effective tax rate on accrued gains is significantly lower
than the nominal statutory rate. In addition, it has been argued that
the ability to exploit the short-term-long-term gains distinction further
erodes the effective rate and may possibly lead to a negative effective
tax rate. For our purposes we note solely that the value of z is bounded
above by the statutory rate.
Three corporate tax variables are relevant to the analysis. These are
the rate of tax on taxable profits that would be paid if no profits were
distributed, denoted by T, the opportunity cost of retained earnings in383 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
terms of gross (i.e. pre-income tax) dividends, foregone, denoted by
6, and the fraction of interest payments that are tax-deductible, denoted
by (3. The value of 6 measures the rate at which cash in the company's
hands may be transformed into cash in the hands of the stockholders
(Feldstein 1970; King 1971, 1977). Under the current U.S. tax system
a transfer of a dollar from the company to the shareholders produces
a gross dividend of one dollar. Hence 0 equals unity. With alternative
tax systems, such as a dividend deduction scheme or the imputation
system employed in most EEC countries, the value of 6 generally ex-
ceeds unity to reflect the credit given to the shareholders, explicitly or
implicitly, for taxes already paid at the corporate level. To evaluate 6
under different tax regimes it is helpful to define the total tax liability
of the company, denoted by T, as the total taxes paid by the company
and stockholders together less the income tax on dividends and capital
gains tax paid by the stockholders. From this definition
(5) T =
where Y is taxable corporate income and G is total gross dividends.
From the definition of 8 the extra taxes (minus the credits) that result
from a distribution are (1 - 0)/0 per unit of gross dividends.
We may now contrast (5) with the formulas that describe the oper-
ation of various tax regimes. Under the current U.S. system the cor-
porate tax liability is simply
(6) T = cY
where c is the rate of corporate income tax.
Equating coefficients in (5) and (6) confirms that T = c and 0 = 1.0.
Under the imputation system used widely in Europe, part of the
corporate tax liability is credited against the shareholders' income tax
liability on dividends. In effect, the company is deemed to have paid
income tax on behalf of the shareholders at some rate, which is de-
scribed as the rate of imputation (denoted by s). Hence
(7) T = cY - sG.
This implies that
(8) T = c
1
0 =
1 - s '
The gross dividend received by the stockholder is equal to the cash
dividend payment made by the company grossed up by the rate of
imputation.384 Mervyn A. King
The Treasury plans proposed that a fraction of dividends be de-
ductible for the purposes of the corporate income tax. Denote the
fraction of dividends that are deductible by X. In Treasury I X was 0.5,
and in Treasury II X was 0.1. With a dividend deduction the corporate
tax liability becomes
(9) T = c(Y - XG).
Hence
(10) T = c
1
e = 1 - cX
From this it can be seen that in terms of economic effects the dividend
deduction proposed is equivalent to an imputation system with a rate
of imputation equal to the product of the corporate tax rate and the
fraction of dividends that is deductible. There are two points to note
about this. First, a change in the corporate tax rate will automatically
change the effective rate of imputation unless a compensating change
in X is made. Second, the effective rate of imputation is very sensitive
to the value of X. For example, in the Treasury I plan, with a corporate
tax rate of 33% and X = 0.5, the effective imputation rate is 16.5%.
Under the Treasury II proposals, with the same corporate tax rate but
X = 0.1, the effective imputation rate is only 3.3%. Moreover, both
values are low when compared with imputation rates in Europe. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the rate of imputation is 30% (from
April 1986, 29%).
The cash flow tax is a variant of the classical system of corporate
income taxation, which is that currently used in the United States. The
value of 6 in both cases is unity. The major difference between the cash
flow tax and the present system lies in the treatment of debt finance.
With a cash flow tax, interest payments are not deductible for corporate
income tax purposes (or, equivalently, borrowing is a taxable receipt).
Debt finance would be less attractive than at present.
The incentive to use different sources of finance can be seen from
the following pairwise comparisons between debt finance, retained
earnings, and new share issues. In each case we compare the net of
tax income that could be distributed out of one unit of corporate profits
corresponding to the differing methods of remunerating investors im-
plied by the different sources of finance. The results are simply stated
below; derivations may be found in King (1977, 1986). At this stage
we ignore indexation of the tax system.
(i) Debt finance is preferred to retained earnings if
(11) (1 - m)>(l - z)(\ - PT).385 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
(ii) Debt finance is preferred to new share issues if
(12) 1 > 0 (1 - pT).
(iii) Retained earnings are preferred to new share issues if
(13) (1 - z) > (1 - m)8.
From these equations it is clear that with a cash flow corporate
income tax there would be fiscal neutrality between debt finance and
new equity issues (from 12). Retained earnings would be the most
attractive source of finance for taxable investors, and financial policy
would be a matter of complete indifference for tax-exempt investors
such as pension funds. Neutrality could be achieved for all investors
by either taxing capital gains at income tax rates or adopting a con-
sumption tax treatment of household capital income. Under the current
U.S. tax code, debt finance dominates new share issues, and for almost
all investors debt finance also dominates retained earnings. With the
dividend deduction proposal of the Treasury plans, the condition for
debt finance to be more attractive than new equity issues is (from 12)
(14) p > X.
Only if the rate at which dividends may be deducted exceeds the
proportion of interest payments that is deductible will new share issues
dominate debt finance. The Treasury plan envisaged retaining full de-
ductibility of interest (P = 1) and values for X of 0.5 and 0.1 for Treasury
I and Treasury II respectively. Under these proposals, debt finance
would retain its tax advantage. Moreover, the effective imputation rate
would be independent of the tax rate of the investor, and so neutrality
between internal and external equity finance would be impossible to
achieve.
It has long been argued in the United States that partial integration
of the corporate and personal income taxes, as far as dividends are
concerned, would alleviate much of the discrimination against equity
inherent in the current system. But partial measures of this type do
not deal adequately with the substantial spread among marginal inves-
tor tax rates. Indeed, the imputation system in Britain has been criti-
cized by the employers' federation (CBI1985, p. 69) on precisely these
grounds.
It is clear that the 1986 system . . . will for a majority of share-
holders, provide either a strong bias in favour of distribution or
indifference as between distribution and retention ... the 1986 sys-
tem will in time produce broadly two types of company:
a) Typical quoted companies with mainly institutional or basic rate
taxpayer shareholders, which will make very full dividend pay-
ments . . .386 Mervyn A. King
b) Companies with largely top rate taxpayer shareholders, making
minimal distributions.
The Exchequer will of course lose substantially as a result of this.
The conclusion reached by the CBFs Tax Reform Working Party was
that Britain should adopt a cash flow corporation tax.
12.4 The Cost of Capital
The principle aim of the cash flow corporate income tax is to avoid
distortion of investment decisions by ensuring that the cost of capital
is independent of the particular investment project under consideration.
By the cost of capital is meant here the pretax rate of return net of
depreciation that is required on a project in order to call forth the funds
needed to finance it. It is the financial rather than the user cost of
capital (the latter includes also the return necessary to finance depre-
ciation of the asset).
To illustrate the effect of the cash flow tax, and of other possible
reforms, on the cost of capital, we consider the simple case in which
true economic depreciation occurs at the nonstochastic exponential
rate 5. With this assumption a firm's cost of capital, denoted by c, is
given by the following expression:
(15) c = {p +8-ir} - 8
(1 - T)
where f2 = proportion of investment expenditure that qualifies for
ordinary depreciation allowances.
f2 = proportion of investment expenditure that receives cash
flow tax treatment (i.e. immediate expensing)
f3 = proportion of investment expenditure that qualifies for a
cash grant or investment tax credit.
A^, = present value of tax savings from ordinary depreciation
allowances,
g = rate of cash grant or equivalent rate of investment tax
credit
p = rate at which company discounts net of corporate tax cash
flows
8 = exponential rate of true economic depreciation
7T = rate of increase of price of investment goods.
Equation (15) states that the required pretax real rate of return on a
project, adjusted for depreciation, is equal to the real rate of return
that must be offered to the suppliers of finance grossed up by the
corporate tax rate and multiplied by the effective price of a new asset.
The latter is the market price less the present value of the tax allowances387 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
for depreciation and other investment incentives. Indexation of depre-
ciation allowances lowers the effective price of capital goods. For sim-
plicity of exposition, (15) omits corporate wealth taxes and the taxation
of the inflationary component of inventory profits. A treatment of these
issues may be found in King and Fullerton (1984) and King (1986).
The value of the rate at which the company discounts net of corporate
tax cash flows, denoted by p, depends upon the source of finance used
for the project and upon the identity of the marginal investor. It depends
also upon the indexation provisions of the tax code. In a partial equi-
librium model in which all investors have identical tax rates, the fol-
lowing are the relevant expressions for the corporate discount rate for
each source of finance (see Appendix for the derivations). The nominal
interest rate in economy is denoted by /.
(16) (i) debt finance p = i(l - 0T) + PTTT/,
(17) (ii) new share issues p = i/6 + -r
1 -£ IT
[(1 - m)0j
,1O, ,.... . . , . . [~1 - ml \mli - z/1
(18) (in) retained earnings p = i \ + hr
[1 - z] I I ~ z j
where /, and Iz are dummy variables that take the value unity when
interest payments and capital gains, respectively, are fully indexed for
tax purposes and are zero in the absence of indexation.
Partial equilibrium expressions for the cost of capital corresponding
to the different sources of finance can be derived by substituting the
appropriate values for the corporate discount rate into equation (15).
In a general equilibrium model, however, we would expect that the
discount rates would be equal for all sources of finance employed by
the firm, and the difficulty in constructing convincing general equilib-
rium models is to imagine plausible mechanisms by which the marginal
discount rates are brought into equality. One such model is the Miller
equilibrium (Miller 1977), in which investors face constraints on short
sales of all assets. In this equilibrium the constraints are binding on all
investors except those who are indifferent between equity and debt
finance as far as taxes are concerned. The marginal investor is the
unconstrained investor, and the company, which itself faces no con-
straints on its financial policy, is indifferent at the margin between debt
and equity finance. For the marginal investor the cost of equity finance
is equal to that of debt finance, and the income tax rate of the marginal
investor is such that the discount rate given by equations (16) and (18)
are equal. Hence from the tax point of view this is equivalent to cal-
culating the cost of capital as if the firm financed marginal projects by
debt finance. In such an equilibrium it is easy to evaluate the effects388 Mervyn A. King
of different tax regimes on the cost of capital and hence on the optimal
level of investment. In the case of the cash flow corporate income tax,
interest payments are not deductible for tax purposes (p = 0) and there
are no indexation provisions. The corporate discount rate is from (16)
simply the nominal interest rate. In addition, all investment expenditure
can be immediately expensed (f2
=l,fi =/3 = 0), and hence from equa-
tion (15) the cost of capital is given by the following expression
(19) c = i - IT = r
In other words, the cost of capital is equal to the real interest rate. The
rates of tax, both at the personal and the corporate level, have no effect
on the relationship between the market interest rate and the required
rate of return on investment projects. The decision rule that a firm uses
in the presence of taxes is identical to the rule that it would use in the
absence of taxes. The existence of a cash flow corporate income tax
does not distort the investment decision.
The reason for this result is clear. With immediate expensing the
government is effectively subsidizing investment at exactly the same
rate as it taxes profits. The cost of any project is reduced by the same
fraction as the future benefits will be reduced when taxes are levied
(assuming a constant tax rate). Given that both the benefits and costs
of the project are reduced in the same proportion, then, provided the
discount rate is unaffected by the tax rate, any project that was accepted
in the absence of a tax would be accepted with the tax. This result
assumes that there are always sufficient taxable profits for the tax
allowances to be used to offset current tax liabilities. Alternatively the
tax system must provide for complete loss offset by allowing tax losses
to be carried forward marked up by the nominal interest rate. With
this tax system the government becomes a partner in the firm, albeit
a sleeping partner (see also King 1975). It makes a contribution on new
investment at the same rate as it shares in the profits of the enterprise.
On new marginal investment projects the system is effectively a zero
tax. But on intramarginal projects and on investment made prior to the
introduction of the cash flow corporate income tax, the tax acts as a
capital levy on the owners of corporate assets.
One of the great advantages of the cash flow tax is that the cost of
capital can be seen to be independent of the inflation rate without any
need to introduce complicated indexation provisions. The same cannot
be said of any tax that attempts to measure "economic profits." The
only long-run problem with the cash flow tax is that there is a possible
time inconsistency involved in government policy. Given that the tax
has no disincentive effects on investment but yields revenue from the
intramarginal projects, the government would have an apparent incen-
tive to announce that the tax rate would remain at its present level but389 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
in the future to go back on its word and to raise the rate of tax. In this
way it would appear to be able to raise additional revenue from lump
sum taxes. If this increase in the tax rate were anticipated, then of
course the tax would no longer be a lump sum tax and investment
decisions would be affected. In practice, the United Kingdom had a
very similar tax system in force from 1973 until 1984, and no attempt
was in fact made to raise the rate of tax. Moreover, this was a period
in which the administration alternated between the two main political
parties. It is possible that concern about their reputation led govern-
ments to forego the short-run benefits of retrospective taxation.
If we maintain the assumption of a Miller equilibrium and turn to
the effects of other possible tax systems, then, with interest deduci-
bility, the only system that is neutral is one that offers no accelerated
depreciation but grants ordinary depreciation allowances at rates cor-
responding to true economic depreciation. These must be fully indexed
for inflation. Such was the aim of Treasury I. Since economic depre-
ciation is notoriously difficult to measure, such a system could only be
expected to approximate the requirements for neutrality. Moreover, in
the discussions that followed the publication of Treasury I, indexation
found much less favor with Congress than with the authors of the
Treasury plans. This experience appears to support the view of the
Meade Committee (1978), which recommended a cash flow corporate
income tax over a tax based on comprehensive income partly on the
grounds that the calculations required for a measure of "economic
profit" were complex and difficult to administer.
If we relax the assumption of a Miller equilibrium, then the discount
rate for the company will reflect the tax treatment of dividends and
personal tax rates on both dividends and capital gains. There is no
really satisfactory general equilibrium model of corporate financial be-
havior outside of the simple Miller equilibrium, but if one were con-
structed, the marginal cost of capital would be a weighted average of
the costs of capital for the different sources of finance. The difficulty
is to identify the weights that would be used. Fewer distortions would
be expected from a tax system that discriminated less between the
different sources of finance, and, as we saw in section 12.3, the cash
flow corporate income tax scored well on this point.
The problem with the simple Miller equilibrium is that it contains a
clearly counterfactual prediction, namely that, except for the marginal
investor, all other investors would be completely specialized in either
debt or equity securities. One simple alternative is to calculate a weighted
average cost of capital, using as weights the average proportion of
investment financed from different sources. Such calculations were
made for the then existing tax system in the comparative study of King
and Fullerton (1984). To contrast the effect of a cash flow tax on the390 Mervyn A. King
cost of capital with that of the Treasury plans, and to compare both
possible reforms with the present system, we present below updated
estimates of the effective marginal tax rate on capital income as cal-
culated in the King and Fullerton study. To do this, the posttax real
rate of return to the investor corresponding to the pretax rate of return
on a project (the cost of capital as defined here) is computed for each
investor. Denote this posttax rate of return by s. The effective marginal




Table 12.2 shows effective marginal tax rates for the United Kingdom
and the United States under several alternative tax regimes. For the
United Kingdom the figures are shown for the pre-1984 position, the
new 1986 regime, and the situation that would result if the 1986 system
were converted into a cash flow corporation tax. In the case of the
United States, the rates are shown for the 1984 starting point, the two
Treasury plans (I and II), and the hypothetical case of Treasury I
amended to include a pure cash flow corporate income tax but with all
the personal tax changes intact. The inflation rate assumed in the cal-
culations is 5% per annum.
It is clear that even without adopting a consumption tax at the per-
sonal level, the cash flow corporate income tax eliminates many of the
more extreme distortions that are evident in the current system.
12.5 Problems of Implementation
12.5.1 Transitional Arrangements
Two sets of issues arise when designing a suitable transition to the
new tax base. The first consists of the problems that arise from the
application of the new tax base. The second is the question of how far
the expected consequences of the old base are continued after the
introduction of the new tax. The second is the easier to deal with and
so is considered first.
On the date when the new base comes into force, companies have
a stock of depreciation allowances that they expect to be able to carry
forward and deduct (in a predetermined time profile) against future
taxable profits. There seems no good reason to deny companies the
right to continue to deduct depreciation allowances on past investment.
To abolish the existing stock of depreciation allowances would be akin
to a windfall profits tax in proportion to past investment—not a happy
precedent to set. Nevertheless, the Hall-Rabushka (1983) plan did imply
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effective can be made retrospective, anticipation of the change would
lead to a collapse in investment in the period between announcement
and the date when the enabling legislation was passed. In the United
Kingdom, it is possible for the government to announce that, condi-
tional upon the proposed legislation receiving Parliamentary approval
within a certain period, the new tax would be effective from the date
of announcement. But in the U.S. context this seems less plausible.
Similar arguments apply to other forms of "losses" that companies
had expected to be able to carry forward to offset against future profits.
Continuation of such loss carryforwards is straightforward under the
real basis, but with the net dividends basis the simplicity of the tax
would be reduced because net distributions constitute a tax-exclusive
base whereas loss carryforwards are inherited from a tax-inclusive
regime. To retain simplicity, the loss carryforwards could be converted
into a stock of tax credits (or, more generally, a flow of tax credits over
time) on the transition date.
The other set of problems results from the implications of the new
base, although their nature differs as between the real and net distri-
butions bases. With the former, the main problem is that debt interest
payments are no longer tax-deductible. For new debt finance this raises
no problems, but for borrowing incurred before the announcement of
the new base there is a retrospective charge on the cost of servicing
the debt, which in some, perhaps many, cases could cause acute fi-
nancial distress for highly geared companies. One solution is simply
to phase out interest deductibility by reducing the proportion of interest
payments that are deductible (the value of (3 in section 12.3) gradually
over a period of, say 5 to 10 years, from unity to zero. As far as the
net distributions basis is concerned there is a more serious transitional
problem. Unless the new basis becomes effective on the date of an-
nouncement, companies would have a strong incentive to raise their
debt-equity ratios by borrowing and paying high dividends before the
transition date, and then to issue new equity in order to repay the loans
and reduce dividends after the transition date in order to repay the
loans and restore their debt-equity ratios to normal levels. Similar
incentives existed in the United Kingdom during the major corporate
tax reforms of 1965 and 1973, and, although revenue losses occurred,
the problem was regarded as manageable. Nevertheless, antiavoidance
provisions would be necessary because the scope for avoidance using
purely financial transactions is large.
12.5.2 Long-run Administrative Problems
In this section we describe some of the administrative problems that
the tax would present on a permanent basis. The first concerns the
treatment of borrowing. Under the corporate cash flow basis, only real393 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
transactions are taken into account and profits made on financial trans-
actions are exempt from tax. This does not appear to be a satisfactory
method of taxing financial institutions. If the cash flow base were
adopted, then a separate tax would be required for such institutions.
Alternatively, under the net equity distributions basis, which does tax
the profits on financial transactions, rules would be required to prevent
companies from issuing debt at artificially high interest rates. Such
payments would be exempt from corporate tax and would be a method
of returning profits to the shareholders free of tax. Of course, this
problem exists under the current tax with interest deductibility. Current
rules would need to be carried over. Some of the other problems that
exist with the current corporate tax system would remain with the new
tax. There would still need to be a distinction between corporate and
personal expenditure in order to levy the appropriate amounts of per-
sonal income tax on benefits provided by the company. Under the net
equity distributions basis, new rules would be required to determine
the amount of dividends that enter the tax base when some part of the
dividend was paid in kind. Shareholder benefits of all types (for ex-
ample, reductions in the price of the company's products when sold
to its shareholders) come under this heading.
A second area of potential problems concerns the phenomenon of
tax exhaustion. This is the situation in which the company has no
current taxable income and is accumulating tax losses that will be
carried forward. A question that arises is how far it is thought to be
acceptable for companies to trade such tax losses among themselves.
Under the existing tax systems in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, trading of tax losses takes place with leasing. The U.S.
authorities have taken a much harder line on this than their U.K.
counterparts, although it is not easy to see why companies should be
prevented from offsetting the unintended effects of an asymmetric tax
system. The limiting case would be to create a market in corporate tax
losses. Failing that, companies could be allowed to carry forward losses
marked up by the market interest rate, which would leave the incentive
to invest unaffected by the asymmetric treatment of positive and neg-
ative taxable profits. In the absence of such a provision, leasing would
be the market solution under the corporate cash flow basis. Under the
net equity distributions basis, a rather different set of companies would
be tax-exhausted. These would be firms that had made substantial
issues of new shares. Such a company could reduce its tax loss by
borrowing in order to purchase shares in other resident companies,
and in the absence of loss carryforward with interest would have an
incentive so to do.
Although these problems are rather different under the two alter-
native bases, they do not seem to be more serious under one than under394 Mervyn A. King
the other. The cash flow basis perhaps has a cosmetic advantage in
appearing more familiar. But the net equity distributions basis would
enable the revenue authorities to adopt a common fiscal year for all
companies without the need for companies to change their own ac-
counting periods.
The treatment of overseas investment and profits remitted from abroad
also raises some important questions. With a cash flow corporation tax
there is no obvious reason to grant credit for foreign taxes paid. This
is because the government, as has been argued above, is a partner in
the firm's equity. If the foreign corporate tax rate is at least as great
as the domestic tax rate, then the government would receive no return
on its investment in the firm's activities overseas. But if foreign tax
credit is denied, then the firm receives a return on its own share of the
investment equal to the net of foreign tax rate return on the investment,
i.e. the return to society on this investment overseas. One problem
with the denial of foreign tax credit is that it would be difficult to impute
that part of foreign taxes attributable to investment made after the
introduction of the cash flow tax and that part attributable to investment
made before the change in the system. Hence an alternative means of
achieving the same objective would be to deny investment relief for
overseas investment. Under the cash flow base this would be straight-
forward in that the investment made overseas would not qualify for
immediate expensing. With the net equity distributions base, an ad-
ditional tax would be levied on overseas investment at the appropriate
tax-inclusive rate. Where the foreign tax rate was below the domestic
corporate tax rate, then the additional charge (or reduction in allow-
ances for investment) would be scaled down in proportion to the ratio
of the two tax rates. It is interesting to note that for 12 years (1972-
84) the U.K. government did allow companies both to receive 100%
first-year allowances on overseas investment made by branches and
also to receive credit for foreign taxes paid. This was effectively a
subsidy to overseas investment. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
this position could be maintained if there were a permanent shift to a
cash flow corporation tax.
12.5.3 Revenue Implications of the Cash Flow Tax
At first sight it might appear that a tax which offers such generous
investment incentives would require a higher tax rate to raise the same
amounts of revenue as under the current corporate tax system. A little
reflection, however, demonstrates that this is not the case. The new
tax base would imply the abolition of investment tax credits and grants,
and also of deductions for interest payments on new loans and for
dividends. A full-scale calculation of the tax rate that would be required
to raise the same amount of revenue would involve a general equilib-395 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
rium analysis of the incentive effects of the new tax. This beyond our
scope here. Instead we report some partial equilibrium estimates of
the rate that will be required assuming no behavioral responses.
In the United Kingdom the Meade Committee (1978) found that over
the period 1964-74 the required tax rate would have been 35% under
the cash flow base and 34% under the net equity distributions base.
These figures compare with the actual tax rate of between 40% and
45% over this period. Subsequently, the 1982 Green Paper on Corpo-
ration Tax claimed that the revenue-neutral rate of tax for the net equity
distributions basis for the period 1973-81 would have been about 200%
on a tax-exclusive basis. But Edwards (1982) showed that this calcu-
lation incorrectly attributed Advance Corporation Tax payments to the
total corporate tax liability, when it is in fact more appropriately seen
as a deduction at source of income tax at the basic rate on dividends.
Making this correction, he found that the revenue-neutral rate assuming
unchanged behavior was 47% for the net equity distributions base, as
compared to the actual rate of 52% that prevailed throughout this pe-
riod. Using individual company data, Mayer (1982) found that for the
period 1965-76 the average rate required for revenue neutrality would
have been 52% under the cash flow base and 42% under the net equity
distributions base. All of these calculations show that there is no reason
to suppose that the tax rate would have to rise if the base were switched
to a corporate cash flow base.
Similar calculations for the United States by Aaron and Galper (1985)
found that for the net equity distributions base a tax rate of 33% would
have raised the same revenue as was in fact raised during the period
1981-83 with a tax rate of 46%. Again there seems reason to suppose
that a switch to a cash flow base would lead to problems of revenue
loss, provided adequate transitional arrangements were made.
12.6 Conclusions
Recent proposals for tax reform have raised the question of how easy
it is to measure economic depreciation for the corporate sector. The
effects of any proposed reform on investment will depend upon their
impact on the cost of capital, which in turn depends upon how the
allowances for depreciation built into the tax code relate to underlying
true economic depreciation. The proposals for economic depreciation
embodied in Treasury I entailed complete indexation of the corporate
tax. It appears that these proposals are unlikely to be implemented. It
is worth considering, therefore, whether there is any alternative tax
base for which the cost of capital is independent of the inflation rate
and which eliminates some of the existing distortions between different
types of investment. One possible candidate is the cash flow corpo-396 Mervyn A. King
ration tax. Two versions of this tax were analyzed in this chapter: the
cash flow base on real transactions and the net equity distributions
base. From the analysis of their effects on investment incentives, and
the administration arrangements that would be required for their im-
plementation, it seems that the cash flow base is worthy of serious
consideration in the current debate on reform of corporate taxation.
Appendix
In this appendix we derive expressions for the nominal discount rate
that companies will use to compare net of corporate income tax cash
flows in different periods. The novel feature is the explicit modeling
of indexation of the tax system. The discount rate depends upon the
source of finance that the firm uses, and can be thought of as the
required net of tax return that the company must earn in order to be
able to persuade investors to supply finance to the company. The cor-
porate discount rate is denoted by p.
(i) Debt Finance
This is the simplest case in which the nominal discount rate is simply
the effective net of tax interest rate at which a company can borrow.
This is the market interest rate, i, less the tax savings for interest
payments granted at the corporate level. A fraction fJ of interest pay-
ments are deductible against the corporate tax rate, and if such pay-
ments are indexed for tax purposes, then the deduction applies only
to real interest payments. Hence
(A.I) p = / - pr(/ -
= /(I - 0T)
where /, is an indexation dummy variable that takes the value unity
when interest payments are indexed for tax purposes and zero otherwise.
(ii) New Share Issues
Where new share issues are the optimal source of finance, the com-
pany will distribute all of its profits as dividends and finance investment
by the sale of new equity. The return that the company earns net of
corporate tax (the value of p) must be such that the net of tax dividend
that it can finance is equal to the investor's opportunity cost of funds,
which in turn is equal to the net of tax interest rate that the investor
can earn on alternative investments. For an investor whose marginal
income tax rate is m, this condition implies that
(A.2) i - m(i - IT/,) = (1 - ra)0p + ZTTIZ397 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
where Iz is a dummy variable that takes the value unity when capital
gains are indexed for tax purposes and is zero otherwise.
The RHS of (A.2) is the net of tax dividend plus the reduction in
capital gains tax resulting from the real capital loss that arises when
all profits are distributed as dividends and capital gains tax is indexed
for inflation. This tax benefit disappears if either inflation is zero or
capital gains tax is unindexed.
Rearranging (A.2) yields
=
G (1 - m)0
(Hi) Retained Earnings
In the case of retained earnings the nominal return earned by the
company, net of the investor's additional capital gains tax liability gen-
erated by the return, must equal the investor's opportunity cost of
funds. Hence
(A.4) i - ra(i - IT/,) = p - z(p - ir/z)
Rearranging terms gives
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Comment Daniel Feenberg
King's thoughtful and precise analysis shows that a cash flow tax could
offer important advantages over the U.S. corporate income tax. A tax
on cash flow is inflation-neutral, it allows a required rate of return equal
to the interest rate, and it abstracts from the impossible tasks of valuing
accrued income and depreciation. While some biases in the valuation
of accruals may be attributed to bureaucratic timidity or political in-
terference, the real difficulty of defining income should not be under-
estimated. A tax levied at a high rate on the difference between two
unobserved but highly correlated flows severely strains the tax admin-
istration machinery.
1 By removing the unobserved components from
the tax base, the cash flow tax reduces the scope for tax avoidance
and therefore the need for regulations.
The most difficult and controversial sections of current tax law reg-
ulate the treatment of asset transactions. Under the cash flow tax, these
are particularly simple. Neither asset valuation nor basis affects (total)
tax payments. Revenue authorities could be indifferent among possible
characterizations of such transactions as sales, mergers, reorganiza-
tions, or acquisitions, because all of them would have identical tax
consequence. In contrast, under an income tax the form and substance
of a transaction often imply different tax liabilities. There would, how-
ever, be a powerful incentive for noncorporate capital to move to the
Daniel Feenberg is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. There is a large industry devoted to disputing estimates of corporate income and
expenses. The local property tax generates a similar government revenue but does
relatively little for the legal and accounting professions. The income tax is levied on a
very small base (taxable income), and errors in the estimates of gross income and
expenses are carried into that base dollar for dollar. Therefore small percentage errors
are magnified. Similar percentage errors in a real estate assessment would generate much
smaller differences in property tax liability.399 The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax
corporate sector, because a deduction for the full purchase price would
accrue to the corporation, while the individual seller would take as
income only the sale price less his basis.
2 Even if cash flow type rules
were extended to the personal sector, in the presence of graduated
rates there is a prodigious scope for gaming the tax system by the
mechanical application of cash flow rules to transactions among tax-
payers in different brackets.
In King's proposal the cash flow tax applies approximately current
income tax rates to the cash flow minus real investment of the cor-
poration. No deductions for interest or dividends are allowed. Equi-
librium in the capital market implies that the present value of the tax
on new investment will have an expected value of zero. Discounted at
the interest rate, the cash flow generated will just equal the price of
capital goods. Since the government takes the same share of gross cash
flow as it provides in initial subsidy, the government's share must also
have a market value of zero. Nevertheless, the tax does generate rev-
enues from the existing capital in the corporate sector, on which the
government takes a share of cash flow but only allows depreciation
deductions.
King argues that it is necessary to continue to tax old capital in order
to avoid windfall gains to the current owners of corporate equity. This
is far from apparent to me. If the investment incentive aspect of the
cash flow tax is effective, then enough additional capital will be brought
forth to equate the marginal product of capital to the interest rate. Old
capital still subject to tax must fall in value relative equally productive
capital placed in service under the new and more generous tax regime.
This would impose a loss on current owners of capital.
If the cash flow tax were implemented in a small corner of the world,
then there would be little effect expected on the aftertax interest rate.
The existing equilibrium, which relates the marginal product of capital
Fk, the corporate tax rate t and the interest rate p,
Fk(\ - t)= p
would be disturbed by new investment that is effectively tax-free until
F'k = p.
But the present value of capital still subject to the old rules must fall
by t to equilibrate the market for old and new capital. The hypothesized
windfall gain to the owners of old capital is possible if investment fails
to respond to the higher after-tax rate of return. Yet in that case the
investment subsidy aspect of the CFT is also ineffective. This may
2. King allows unused depreciation allowances to be carried forward into the new tax
regime, but disallows all existing basis. This would be the source of some horizontal
inequity.400 Mervyn A. King
surprise some readers: if the tax on old capital is not increased, how
can the owners have a justified complaint against the government? The
answer depends on the constitutional structure of society, and stands
apart from the question of the loss itself, which is unambiguous.
Certainly the history of corporate taxes in the United States since
1945 has been one of declining rates on new capital essentially without
change in the treatment of existing capital. Therefore the cash flow tax
may be the end of a road we are already well along. Current investment
may well be inhibited by the expectation that capital placed in service
today will be competing with still more lightly taxed capital available
to firms tomorrow. In that case failure to adopt the expected incentives
will generate windfall gains for owners of existing capital. But there
can be no presumption that maintaining current rules only for existing
capital will prevent windfall gains and losses. Indeed, in the example
above, windfall gains and losses can be avoided only by a commitment
to tax all capital under the same rules, even if those rules change
through time.